Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence

The Srebrenica Massacre (July 11-16, 1995)

2010-07-07T07:16:42Z

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In mid-July 1995, soon after the war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had begun its military and diplomatic dénouement, Bosnian Serb soldiers and members of at least one paramilitary police unit belonging to the government of the Republic of Serbia (The Scorpions – see appendix) executed thousands of captive Slavic Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica, a United Nations-designated «safe area» located near Bosnia's eastern border with Serbia (BBC News, Matt Prodger, 2005; ICTY, 2009, IT-03-69, p. 1522). These executions – which were accompanied by the suicides and combat deaths of other Slavic Muslim men, the rapes, killings, and suicides of Muslim women, the killings of Muslim children, and the expulsion from Srebrenica of about 40,000 Muslim people – amounted to Europe's largest massacre since Yugoslav Communist Partisans executed thousands of prisoners after World War II. Both the United Nations Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the United Nation's principal judicial organ, the International Court of Justice, ruled that the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and expulsions constituted an act of genocide (ICTY, 2001, IT-98-33; ICTY, 2004, IT-98-33-A; ICJ, 2007; H.E. Judge Rosalyn. Higgins, 2007). The International Court of Justice ruled that the Republic of Serbia was responsible for failing to prevent the act of genocide at Srebrenica and also for failing to punish the persons who had perpetrated this act (ICJ, 2007; H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 2007).

A. Context

Yugoslavia – with its mélange of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Slavic Muslims, Albanians, Montenegrins, members of smaller ethnic groups, and persons born of mixed marriages – emerged after World War I as an independent kingdom under a Serb king and a predominantly nationalist Serb political elite that resorted to strong-arm tactics to subdue political foes and separatists from other ethnic groups. During World War II, Nazi Germany and its allies dismembered Yugoslavia and gave control of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croat nationalist extremists who, during a campaign to create an ethnically pure Croat state, ignited Croat-Serb and Serb-Muslim animosities and inter-communal violence. Massacres of civilians in Srebrenica and other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina left deep wounds on the survivors' psyches. Yugoslavia's postwar Communist regime tried using police repression, economic incentives, and agitprop to dampen ethnic animosities; it considered Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnically mixed and largely peasant population to be especially volatile. According to the 1991 census, the ethnic structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina's population was: Slavic Muslims, 44 percent; Serbs, 32 percent; Croats, 17 percent; and persons who considered themselves ethnic Yugoslavs, 5 percent. The Srebrenica district, a mining area, was home to 36,666 people in 1991; 75 percent were Slavic Muslims, 22.6 percent were Serbs, and the remainder were Croats, Yugoslavs, and others (Census, 1991, Bilten no. 234).

Yugoslavia's descent into ethnic violence in the 1990s resulted from a dysfunctional socialist economic system, resurgent nationalism, and the policies of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, who exploited popular fears and memories of past violence to secure themselves power in successor states they were working to expand. Milošević's and Tudjman's territorial ambitions overlapped in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of the nationalist Serb party in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to seize as much territory as possible and join it with Serbia. Supported by the Republic of Serbia and the Yugoslav National Army, Bosnian Serb forces began a land grab a few weeks before the European Community and the United States recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state in April 1992. By late summer, Serb forces had driven hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Croats from their homes. About seven weeks after a failed peace conference in London in August, nationalist Croat forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, backed by the Republic of Croatia's Army, launched its first ethnic-cleansing operation against Muslims, at Prozor, a town on territory Tudjman wanted to absorb into Croatia (SENCE - Tribunal, 2006; ICTY, 2008, IT-04-74-T). The United Nations deployed a «peacekeeping» force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the autumn of 1992 but limited its mission to protecting delivery of food, medicines, and other aid. Local Muslim forces recaptured Srebrenica from the Serbs in May 1992 but, by that autumn, the Muslims in Srebrenica – including thousands of people violently uprooted from Zvornik, Bratunac, Višegrad, and other nearby towns and villages – were encircled, running low on food and medical supplies, and receiving no food or other aid. Lightly armed Muslim soldiers and civilians attacked poorly defended Serb villages around Srebrenica, stealing food and killing Serb soldiers and civilians. These attacks enraged the Serbs and expanded the area controlled by Muslim forces in Srebrenica under the command of Naser Orić.

In January 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina's mostly Muslim Army was fighting a two-front war against nationalist Serbs and Croats. Serb forces controlled two-thirds of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory, but the Serbs still coveted Srebrenica and two other Muslim enclaves along the Bosnia-Serbia border, Žepa and Goražde, because their existence would stymie the Serb campaign to merge Serb-held territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Republic of Serbia itself. From a strategic point of view, taking control of Srebrenica was in fact indispensable and meant the «reunification of Serb territory», creating a monolithic Serbian political entity that was coherent and viable. The Muslims in Srebrenica attacked northwestward in late 1992 and mid-January 1993 and advanced to within several kilometers of Bosnian government-controlled territory. This advance prompted the Bosnian Serb Army to launch a counteroffensive. During February, March, and April, it collapsed the Srebrenica enclave and forced thousands of Muslims from outlying villages into the overcrowded town of Srebrenica, where they suffered hunger, exposure, and Serb shelling attacks. The United Nations Security Council declared Srebrenica to be a safe area on April 16. The United Nations deployed several hundred peacekeeping troops to deter attacks by their mere presence, not by strength in numbers or firepower (HRW, 1995; Sudetic, 1998). A United Nations evacuation operation and overland treks through Serb territory reduced Srebrenica's population to about 40,000. The town came to resemble a concentration camp occupied by disaffected Muslims, patrolled by United Nation peacekeepers, and surrounded by Serbs, many of whom were seeking vengeance (H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, 2007).

In March 1995, the Bosnian Serb President and Commander in Chief of the Bosnian Serb Army, Radovan Karadžić, issued an order (Directive No. 7) to the Bosnian Serb Army's Main Staff, commanded by Ratko Mladić, to, «by planned and well-thought-out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica» (ICTY, 2000, IT-98-33; ICTY, 2001, IT-98-33, p. 6384). The Serbs attacked on July 6. The United Nations peacekeepers, from The Netherlands, proved to be no deterrent. The enclave's Muslim forces were feckless. The Serb forces shelled Srebrenica for days, overran several United Nations observation posts around the safe area's edge, taking peacekeepers hostage. United Nations officials protested. The Serbs pressed ahead. On July 10, peacekeepers fought beside the Muslims against the Serbs for several hours before the Muslims began abandoning their positions. Late that evening, the United Nations commander in Srebrenica assured local Muslim leaders that NATO air strikes the next morning would halt the Serb onslaught. The offensive resumed after dawn. A pinprick NATO airstrike had no effect. Srebrenica's Muslims began fleeing in two main groups. About 25,000 Muslims, the vast majority of them women, children, and aged persons, trudged northward for five kilometers and sought protection at the United Nations base at Potočari; there, after dark, Serb soldiers began terrorizing and killing Muslims in the crowd. About 15,000 Muslim men, some 5,000 of them armed, attempted to march in a column through 30 kilometers of hostile territory to reach friendly lines; on the morning of July 12, Serbs split the column; thousands of Muslim men and boys subsequently surrendered.

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The Last Military Dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983): the Mechanism of State Terrorism

2010-07-05T07:00:00Z

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A. Context

In order to understand the unique nature of the last military dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983) and the fact that, in terms of human rights violations, it was the cruellest ever experienced in the Southern Cone, it is necessary first of all to outline some general historical characteristics of Argentina in the twentieth century.

The military regime which began in 1976 is not an isolated experience, but the most extreme expression of a series of militar interventions (1930-1932, 1943-1946, 1955-1958, 1962-1963, 1966-1973). These repeated authoritarian episodes – a constant typical of Argentine history in the twentieth century - can be explained by many different approaches and types of analysis. Firstly, those authors who concentrate above all on the functioning of the political system employ the concept of ‘pretorianism' to explain the naturalised alternation between political parties and the military, which tacitly establishes a pendulum swing between authoritarianism and democracy within the same political model. According to this approach, the military interventions do not imply a rupture of the political system but a valid possibility inherent within it. The military alternative is justified by a ‘loss of faith in democracy' by a majority of citizens, who then lend their support to this type of move, creating its legitimacy (Quiroga, 2004).

Other authors, while not losing sight of the relations between State and society, focus on social dynamics and find that this process is consistent with the increasing militarization of Argentine society and the politization of the armed forces: whereas in 1930 the protagonists of the military coup were a retired general and cadets at the Military college, in 1976 the instigators were the commanders-in-chief of the military establishment (Mallimaci, 1995:233). This process led to the gradual emergence of norms of social behaviour and shifts in meaning that created a political and ideological culture which naturalised the recourse to violence as an efficient, legitmate means of resolving conflicts. The early years of the twentieth century saw the first of a whole battery of laws aimed at reinforcing social discipline. 1901 saw Law 4,031 on Compulsory Military Service (to ‘civilise' the male population), in 1902 came Law 4,144 on Residency (to get rid of ‘disruptive' foreigners), and in 1910 Law 7,029 on Social Defence was passed, prohibiting associations and/or meetings for the spread of anarchism and making the return of anyone expelled from Argentina a criminal offence.

Gradually, with each successive military intervention, a social climate was created that showed great tolerance towards the treatment of the ‘other' through repressive measures. During the military intervention from 1930 onwards, the ‘Special Section' of the Federal police was created. This was aimed at combatting Communism and was led by Leopoldo Lugones (son), who was well-known for innovating in the use of the electric cattle prod during the interrogation of political prisoners (Funes, 2004: 36). From then on, the use of torture became systematic, and was used both on political prisoners and common criminals (Calveiro, 1998: 25). Moreover, repression was not exclusively employed in penal institutions such as jails, but was seen in different guises in the public space: in 1955, the bombing by 29 Argentine Navy planes of a civil demonstration in Plaza de Mayo, the government palace and the presidential residence, left a toll of more than 300 dead and hundreds of wounded, in a vain attempt to close the Peronist chapter of Argentine history. This event led to an 18-year proscription of the political party representing the majority of the electorate. After this came the abduction of Eva Perón's corpse, repression of the Peronist movement's leadership, and the attempt to ‘deperonise society' by force, including a ban on using their leader's name and any reference to ‘Peronism', both of which were prohibited by decree (Calveiro, 2006: 28).

Some analysts see this ban on Peronism, even though it was brought in as part of a ‘democratic process' that was only barely republican and pluralist, and introduced in the belief that ‘formal' democracy should not stand in the way of ‘real' democracy, as the final blow that destroyed all credibility in the restoration of democratic rule. In this context of the erosion of democratic legitimacy, the political system lost its ability to resolve social conflicts. These came to be settled in other scenarios, where corporate interests (businessmen, trade unionists, the armed forces, religious interests) came to the fore (Romero, 2001). The elected governments of Frondizi (1958-1962) and Illia (1963-1966) which this process gave rise to found themselves constrained by a ‘corset' of ‘liberty under surveillance' that was still further restricted by a succession of demands by the military which eventually led to coups that brought an end to their governments.

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Pour la liberté de la recherche

2010-06-14T07:03:23Z

Pour la liberté de la recherche

Le comité de rédaction de l'Encyclopédie des violences de masse

Exprime son soutien à Karoline Postel-Vinay

Notre collègue Karoline Postel-Vinay, directrice de recherche au CERI (unité mixte de recherche Sciences Po-CNRS) et spécialiste du Japon, est poursuivie en justice par la « Fondation Franco- Japonaise, dite Sasakawa » (FFJDS), pour « diffamation ». Certains d'entre nous ont été témoins de la façon brutale dont la FFJDS a lancé son action, le 5 mars 2009. Au cours d'un colloque à Sciences Po auquel participaient de nombreux collègues, un huissier de justice a remis à Karoline Postel-Vinay une demande d'assignation à comparaître devant le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris.

Le procès engagé par la FFJDS fait suite à une pétition relayée par Karoline Postel-Vinay en décembre 2008, et signée par une cinquantaine de chercheurs spécialistes du Japon et de l'Asie Orientale. La pétition demandait au ministre français des Affaires étrangères de retirer le soutien qu'il avait initialement apporté à une manifestation officielle célébrant le 150e anniversaire des relations diplomatiques franco-japonaises. Cette manifestation était financée principalement par la FFJDS.

Les signataires regrettaient que pour un tel événement, la République Française s'associe à une institution se réclamant de Ryôichi Sasakawa, figure bien connue du fascisme japonais, arrêté par les Alliés en décembre 1945 comme criminel de guerre de classe A, et généralement considéré comme lié à la pègre.

La pétition rappelait également que Ryôichi Sasakawa n'avait jamais répudié son passé ni celui du Japon militariste, et que la famille Sasakawa restait proche du mouvement négationniste japonais actuel, son think tank la Tokyo Foundation ayant notamment entrepris de promouvoir à travers le monde le livre de Higashinakano, « The Nanking Massacre. Fact versus Fiction » qui affirme qu'il n'y a pas eu de massacre à Nankin en 1937. Le chapitre 17 s'intitule tout simplement « De nouvelles preuves permettent de conclure qu'il n'y a pas eu de massacre à Nankin » (http://www.ne.jp/asahi/unko/tamezou/nankin/fiction/index.html).

Le ministère des Affaires étrangères, après avoir mené sa propre enquête, décida de se désolidariser de la manifestation.

En mandatant un huissier de justice en plein colloque, en concentrant son action sur un seul des signataires de la pétition, la démarche de la FFJDS vise à porter atteinte à la réputation de la personne et met en oeuvre une stratégie d'intimidation qui a pour cible l'ensemble de la communauté des chercheurs en sciences sociales.

Par ailleurs la FFJDS se considère aujourd'hui diffamée par le rappel de faits qui ont été maintes fois présentés dans des ouvrages scientifiques, des essais, et des articles de presse de nombreux pays sans jamais susciter de plainte.

A la veille d'une décision de justice dont les conséquences seront importantes et multiples pour la liberté intellectuelle en France et ailleurs, nous souhaitons exprimer notre soutien à Karoline Postel-Vinay.

Nous nous associons ainsi aux déclarations de

l'Association Française de Science Politique

(http://www.afsp.msh-paris.fr/),

de la Société Française d'Etudes Japonaises

(http://sfej.asso.fr/site/SoutienSFEJKarolyne%20Postel-Vinay.html)

des professeurs et chercheurs de Sciences Po

(http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/k_postelvinay.pdf)

de l'Association des Professeurs d'Histoire et Géographie

(http://www.aphg.fr/Actualités.htm)

Autres communiqués

Ligue des Droits de l'Homme :

http://www.ldh-france.org/Refuser-le-negationnisme-respecter

Fondation de la Résistance : http://www.fondationresistance.org/pages/accueil/

Pétition internationale sur le site du Centre d'Etudes Français sur la Chine Contemporaine (French Center for Research on Contemporary China) :

http://www.cefc.com.hk/rubrique.php ?id=118&aid=480

Le croquis, un nouvel outil interprétatif

2010-06-14T06:57:58Z

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Questionner la subjectivité d'acteurs appartenant à une minorité ethno-confessionnelle et ayant vécu un épisode de violence et d'une souffrance, invite le chercheur à se confronter aux expériences liées à la souffrance, à la perte et au désarroi. Pour les protagonistes, la difficulté à accorder un sens à ce passé mouvementé est d'autant plus grande qu'ils ne parviennent que rarement à se projeter dans un avenir optimiste. C'est au cours d'une enquête sociologique menée à Istanbul axée sur la construction mémorielle des Rûms d'Istanbul, principale cible du pogrom de la nuit du 6 au 7 septembre 1955, que je me suis heurtée à ce constat. Avant d'entrer dans le vif du sujet, il est nécessaire de préciser les termes : qui sont les Rûms d'Istanbul ? Ce terme désigne les grécophones chrétiens, citoyens de Turquie. Ils se nomment ainsi en référence à l'Empire ottoman et représentent la communauté non-musulmane la plus importante en 1955. En effet, le paysage culturel d'Istanbul dans les années 50 est composé de trois communautés transformées en minorités lors du Traité de Lausanne de 1923 (Courbage Y. et Fargues P., 1996). Selon le recensement général du 22 octobre 1950, sur une population totale de 983 041 Stambouliotes, on comptait 42652 Arméniens, 28114 juifs et 66106 Rûms. Ces derniers représentent aujourd'hui moins de 5 000 personnes. Au cours d'une enquête qualitative à Istanbul rassemblant un corpus de vingt-et-un entretiens semi directifs et deux entretiens groupés auprès des Rûms d'Istanbul, j'ai cherché à comprendre quelles sont leurs représentations, leurs interprétations et leurs stratégies de survie au lendemain des événements de septembre, épisodes au cours desquels des émeutes anti-rûms et au-delà, anti-« minoritaires » (Bozarslan, 2004 : 52), éclatèrent principalement à Istanbul et eurent pour conséquences le saccage ou la destruction de 6 675 bâtiments, provoquant quelques morts et une soixantaine de viols (Güven, 2006).

Le choix de méthodes d'enquêtes qualitatives (entretiens semi directifs et récits de vie) est habituellement privilégié car il permet le recueil d'un matériau qui entend saisir des représentations, des systèmes de valeurs et des logiques de pensée aux échelles individuelle et collective. En se plaçant au coeur des points de vue des acteurs, l'entretien traduit sous forme de récits de vie, de trajectoires individuelles et familiales, les lignes de vie et les parcours des enquêtés. Favorisant la compréhension des questions que les acteurs se posent à eux-mêmes, son ancrage dans les expériences vécues et sur les représentations du passé (et du présent) des enquêtés en tant qu'acteurs sociaux peut offrir de nouvelles pistes. Or, ces récits risquent d'être pris dans une politique mémorielle traduisant les représentations collectives d'une expérience commune (Hartog F. et Revel J., 2001). D'une part, cet ensemble des interventions des pouvoirs publics légitimes cherche à produire, voire imposer des représentations mémorielles au collectif en s'appuyant sur des instruments publics (comme les « lois mémorielles », journées nationales, manuels et programmes scolaires). D'autre part, les principaux représentants de la communauté rûm proposent une lecture d'après leur représentation collective de ce pogrom. A défaut de révéler explicitement les logiques individuelles, familiales, ils produisent un méta-récit, fruit d'un discours communautaire qui ne laisse pas toujours entendre les voix individuelles. Le méta-récit se traduit par un discours empruntant un registre universel sur les thèmes de la souffrance, de la victimisation ou encore de la survalorisation de soi. Cette « mémoire historique » (Halbwachs, 1950) considérée comme norme de la mémoire collective par une communauté, s'accompagne d'une surestimation d'un souvenir inaltérable, érigé en facteur de résistance aux usages politiques et autres manipulations de l'histoire.

Le recours à la méthode projective permet d'échapper à une conception étroite de la mémoire collective comme somme des souvenirs de l'expérience vécue et partagée. Cet outil interprétatif élaboré par Guy Michelat a été repris par Marie-Claire Lavabre qui a alors exploité le rapport entre photographie et mémoire au cours d'une enquête empirique sur la mémoire communiste (Lavabre, 1994). Refusant de prendre en considération la manière dont un groupe commémore, interprète, instrumentalise voire falsifie l'histoire, elle part du double postulat que la photographie atteste de la représentation présente du passé et peut donc constituer un « aide-mémoire » d'autant plus performant qu'il renvoie à une expérience commune. L'objectif exact est d'isoler la mémoire collective, comme point d'interaction entre mémoire officielle (ou usages politiques du passé) et mémoire vive (ou souvenirs de l'expérience vécue) et comme intersection entre la mémoire historique et la mémoire commune. Néanmoins, même si l'image mobilise l'affectivité des enquêtés et déclenche le souvenir des émotions passées, des écueils persistent. Lavabre indique que le traitement du discours produit aurait pu faire l'objet d'une analyse systématique, mais en prenant le risque de subir les critiques de surinterprétation formulées par les psychologues qui récusent cette méthode. Ainsi, d'après l'expérience du test projectif durant notre enquête, les témoignages récoltés n'ont apporté que de manière partielle des éléments de réponse ou offraient encore une lecture diachronique de l'événement par un découpage temporel sans toutefois spécifier la nature ou encore les significations de ce traumatisme.

Mais alors quel outil méthodologique permettrait d'éviter ces écueils et de faire éclore l'expression de la violence émanant d'un cheminement réflexif personnel ? Sur le terrain, j'ai découvert par hasard un outil interprétatif, capable d'activer le processus de remémoration. Lors de mon enquête de terrain, un enquêté a relaté son parcours la nuit du 6 au 7 septembre 1955 en dessinant sur une feuille de papier blanc l'espace où se sont déroulés ces épisodes de violence (R.M. Downs et D. Stea : 2005). Ce marquage du territoire se traduit par des repères spatiaux définis par l'enquêté (son lieu de vie, son voisinage, son école). Ainsi, le croquis remplit non seulement la fonction d'aide-mémoire mais il permet au chercheur d'identifier comment les points de cristallisation et d'intersection des mémoires collectives et individuelles se sont fixés dans un espace.

croquis 03 bakirkoy

À la lumière de cette expérience stimulante, cet article se propose d'exposer l'utilisation et les apports de cette méthode empirique favorisant la lecture d'un événement brutal. Comment cet aide-mémoire parvient-il à expliciter et mettre en lumière les stratégies employées par ces protagonistes ? À travers l'exemple de l'investigation menée à Istanbul en mars-avril 2008, je tenterai ensuite de démontrer comment l'utilisation des croquis offre la possibilité de saisir un événement non pas dans le temps mais en redéfinissant l'espace en fonction des repères spatiaux identifiés par les protagonistes.

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Massacres in Dismembered Yugoslavia, 1941-1945

2010-06-07T06:54:18Z

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The acts of mass violence committed on Yugoslav territory between 1941 and 1945 are dealt with in a Yugoslav context, not in that of each of the countries making up Yugoslavia. While the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dismantled in April 1941, it has to be said that the country did not collapse from within and that important political and military actors continued to act with a view to restoring Yugoslavia. This is true of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (or movement of the četnici), led by General Dragoljub Mihailović and supported by the Yugoslav government in exile, but also of the movement of the communist partisans (partizani), who, while fighting the occupiers, wanted to take power in a reshaped Yugoslav state. The Second World War only affected Yugoslavia from April 1941 onwards. In fact, Hitler's Germany had no particular designs on this state. It was only following a putsch on 27 March 1941, resulting in the overthrow of the Yugoslav government which had adhered to the Tripartite Pact two days earlier, that Germany, supported by its Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian allies, decided to invade the country.

This chronological index is not exhaustive. Rather than cataloguing the totality of atrocities committed during the Second World War – which would be a tedious and rather indigestible undertaking – the aim here is to reflect the violence committed by each of the parties involved (occupiers and internal agents) by selecting the most relevant instances. The regions treated are mainly Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The mass violence perpetrated on the territory of Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945 is still the subject of lively polemics, especially as regards the total number of victims. The official figures established by the Yugoslav authorities after 1945, fixing the number of victims at 1.7 million people, were challenged in the second half of the 1980s by independent researchers (Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić), who estimated the total number of war casualties at around one million.

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Kvaternik (1910-1962), Eugen Dido

2010-06-07T06:51:21Z

The son of Slavko Kvaternik and Olga Kvaternik, born Frank, who was the daughter of the politician Josip Frank. Having begun legal studies, he became heavily involved in Croatian nationalist youth organizations and took part in underground actions by the Ustaša movement. In 1933, he went into exile in Germany and Austria and then settled in Italy. In 1934, he received orders from Ante Pavelić to organize the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia.

He was arrested in October 1934 at the same time as Ante Pavelić. He was imprisoned until 29 March 1936. He returned to Croatia on 13 April 1941, three days after his father Slavko had proclaimed the foundation of the Independent State of Croatia. On 15 April, he was named Head of Public Order and Security for Zagreb and then, on 18 April, for the whole of the Independent State of Croatia. On 4 May 1941, he was promoted to Secretary of State in the Interior Ministry headed by Andrija Artuković. He played a major role in the establishment of the country's security apparatus and its policy of terror against Serbs, Jews and Roma. In September 1942, he handed his resignation to Ante Pavelić and left Zagreb for Slovakia in January 1943 with his family. After residing in Austria and Italy, he settled in Argentina in 1947, where he died in a car accident.

Source: 1997, Tko je tko u NDH: Hrvatska 1941.-1945., Zagreb: Minerva.

Mihailović (1893-1946), Dragoljub

2010-06-07T06:47:16Z

Officer in the Army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, he became military attaché in Sofia in 1935 and then Prague in 1936. In May 1937, he became chief of staff of the Drava Division based in Ljubljana. In April 1938, he held the post of commander of the 39th infantry regiment in Celje. Promoted to colonel in 1939, he was transferred to the Military Academy of Belgrade. Commander in the Second Yugoslav Army based in Bosnia during the April 1941 war, he withdrew with his men to western Serbia in the region of Ravna Gora, situated between the towns of Valjevo and Čačak, after having refused to recognize the country's surrender on 15 April. Having opted for resistance to the Axis forces, during summer 1941 Draža Mihailović established an embryonic high command under the name of Command of Četnic Detachments of the Yugoslav Army. These units were shortly afterwards renamed ‘military-četnik detachments' (Vojno-četnicki odredi).

In November 1941, the Yugoslav government in exile appointed Draža Mihailović commander of the patriotic forces that had remained in Yugoslavia. The četnik forces were now renamed ‘Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland' (Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini, JVUO) in order to stress the military and state continuity with pre-war Yugoslavia. In January 1942, Draža Mihailović was appointed Army, Navy and Air Force Minister by the Yugoslav government in exile. Although essentially military, the Ravna Gora movement equipped itself with a political wing in August 1941, by creating a Central National Committee of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije, CNK), which was supposed to bring together the heads of the political parties who had remained in the country, the representatives of patriotic organizations, and famous intellectuals.

Draža Mihailović was opposed to a precipitate struggle against the Germans. He wanted, as far as possible, to preserve the Serbian population from pointless losses and preferred to wait for the most opportune moment to launch an insurrection against the occupying forces. Although presented by the western press, British and American, as the head of the first guerrilla movement in occupied Europe, Draža Mihailović did not initiate any battle of significance against the occupying forces. On the contrary, having made the communist partisans his main enemies, the armed forces identified with his movement were led to collaborate with the Italians and Germans, particularly in 1943.

Confronted with the entry of the Red Army into Serbia, he took refuge in northern Bosnia in September 1944. Arrested in March 1946, he was tried from 10 June to 15 July 1946, on which date he was condemned to death.

Source: Nikolić, K., 2005, General Dragoljub Mihailović, 1893-1946, Belgrade: Zavod za Udžbenike I nastavna sredstva.

Pavelić (1889-1959), Ante

2010-06-07T06:45:51Z

Born in Bradina na Ivan, a village in Herzegovina, Ante Pavelič completed his education in Zagreb, where he studied law. As a secondary-school pupil, he joined the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), of which he became one of the leaders in 1918. In 1921, he was elected a municipal councilor for Zagreb. In 1927, he was elected as a deputy in the Assembly of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the list of the Croatian Bloc. He declared for the independence of Croatia. After the proclamation of the dictatorship by King Alexander on 6 January 1929, he went into exile abroad, in Vienna and then Sofia, where an agreement was signed with the Macedonian nationalists to destroy Yugoslavia. On 17 July 1929, he was condemned in absentia by the Tribunal for the Protection of the State. He then found refuge in Italy where, in late 1930, he founded a clandestine revolutionary nationalist organization: Ustaša, the Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UHRO).

From 1931, he set up training camps in Italy and Hungary. He organized the Marseille assassination of the King of Yugoslavia, for which he was once again condemned to death in absentia. Under French pressure, he was arrested in October 1934 and imprisoned in Turin until 1936. Following an agreement between Yugoslavia and Italy in April 1937, he closed the camps of the Ustaša organization and was kept in detention until 1939. He returned to Croatia on 15 April 1941 as head (poglavnik) of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna država Hrvatska) and on 16 April appointed a government in which he held the posts of President of the Cabinet and Foreign Minister. He established a totalitarian regime in Croatia inspired by Nazi Germany that pursued a policy of terror – in particular, against Serbs, Jews and Roma. He fled Zagreb on 6 May 1945 and, via Austria and Italy, settled in Argentina. Following an attack on him on 10 April 1957, he left Argentina for Spain.

Source: 1997, Tko je tko u NDH: Hrvatska 1941.-1945., Zagreb: Minerva.

Massacres dans la Yougoslavie démembrée, 1941-1945

2010-05-31T06:40:00Z

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Les violences de masse commises dans l'espace yougoslave entre 1941 et 1945 sont abordées dans un cadre yougoslave et non dans celui de chacun des pays le composant. En effet, si le royaume de Yougoslavie a été démantelé en avril 1941, force est de constater que le pays ne s'est pas effondré de l'intérieur et que des acteurs politiques et militaires significatifs continuent d'agir dans la perspective du rétablissement de la Yougoslavie : c'est le cas de l'Armée yougoslave dans la patrie (ou mouvement des četnici) dirigée par le général Dragoljub Mihailović et soutenue par le gouvernement yougoslave en exil, mais également du mouvement des partisans communistes (partizani), qui tout en combattant les occupants souhaitent prendre le pouvoir dans un Etat yougoslave remodelé. La Seconde Guerre mondiale n'affecte la Yougoslavie qu'à partir d'avril 1941. En effet, l'Allemagne d'Hitler n'avait pas de visée particulière sur cet Etat. Ce n'est qu'à la suite d'un putsch, survenu le 27 mars 1941, et ayant provoqué le renversement du gouvernement yougoslave qui avait adhéré au Pacte tripartite deux jours plus tôt, que l'Allemagne, appuyée par ses alliés italiens, hongrois et bulgares, décide d'envahir le pays.

Cet index chronologique ne présente pas un caractère exhaustif. Plutôt que de recenser l'ensemble des atrocités commises pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale – ce qui représenterait un travail fastidieux et quelque peu indigeste – l'objectif est ici de refléter les violences commises par chacune des parties impliquées (occupants et acteurs internes) en sélectionnant les cas les plus pertinents possibles. Les régions traitées sont principalement la Serbie, la Croatie et la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Les violences de masse commises dans l'espace yougoslave entre 1941 et 1945 font toujours l'objet de vives polémiques, en particulier à propos du nombre total de victimes. Les chiffres officiels établis par les autorités yougoslaves après 1945 fixant le nombre de victimes à 1,7 million de personnes ont été remis en question dans la seconde moitié des années 1980 par des chercheurs indépendants (Bogoljub Kočović, Vladimir Žerjavić), estimant à un million environ le nombre de victimes de guerre.

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Mihailović, Dragoljub

2010-05-31T06:30:00Z

Officier de l'Armée du royaume de Yougoslavie, Dragoljub Mihailović (1893-1946) devient attaché militaire à Sofia en 1935 puis à Prague en 1936. En mai 1937, il devient le chef d'état-major de la Division de la Drave établie à Ljubljana. En avril 1938, il occupe le poste de commandant du 39e régiment d'infanterie à Celje. Promu au grade de colonel en 1939, il est muté à l'Académie militaire de Belgrade. Commandant au sein de la Seconde armée yougoslave établie en Bosnie pendant la guerre d'avril 1941, il se replie en Serbie occidentale avec ses hommes dans la région de la Ravna Gora, située entre les villes de Valjevo et Čačak après avoir refusé de reconnaître la capitulation du pays le 15 avril. Ayant fait le choix de la résistance aux forces de l'Axe, Draža Mihailović fonde, durant l'été 1941, un état-major embryonnaire sous le nom de Commandement des unités četnik de l'Armée yougoslave. Ces unités sont rebaptisées peu de temps après « unités militaro-četnik » (Vojno-četnicki odredi ).

En novembre 1941, le gouvernement yougoslave en exil nomme Draža Mihailović commandant des forces patriotiques demeurées en Yougoslavie. A cette occasion, les forces četnik sont renommées « Armée yougoslave dans la patrie » (Jugoslovenska vojska u Otadžbini , JVUO) afin de souligner la continuité militaire et étatique avec la Yougoslavie d'avant-guerre. En janvier 1942, Draža Mihailović est nommé ministre des Armées, de la Marine et de l'Aviation par le gouvernement yougoslave en exil. Bien qu'essentiellement militaire, le mouvement de la Ravna Gora se dote d'une aile politique en août 1941 en créant un Comité national central du royaume de Yougoslavie (Centralni nacionalni komitet Kraljevine Jugoslavije, CNK) censé réunir les chefs de partis politiques demeurés dans le pays, les représentants d'organisations patriotiques et des intellectuels de renom. Draža Mihailović est opposé à une lutte précipitée contre les Allemands : il souhaite préserver au maximum la population serbe de pertes inutiles et préfère attendre le moment le plus opportun pour lancer une insurrection contre les forces d'occupation.

Bien que présenté par la presse occidentale, anglaise et américaine, comme le chef du premier mouvement de guérilla dans l'Europe occupée, Draža Mihailović n'initie aucun combat d'envergure contre les forces d'occupation. Au contraire, ayant fait des partisans communistes ses principaux ennemis, les forces armées qui se réclament de son mouvement seront conduites à collaborer avec les Italiens et les Allemands en particulier en 1943. Face à l'entrée de l'Armée rouge en Serbie, il se réfugie dans le nord de la Bosnie en septembre 1944. Arrêté en mars 1946, il est jugé du 10 juin au 15 juillet 1946, date à laquelle il est condamné à mort.

Source : Nikolić, K., 2005, General Dragoljub Mihailović, 1893-1946, Belgrade : Zavod za Udžbenike i nastavna sredstva